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WATER-SUPPLY STRINGENCIES-FEATURES,
ANTECEDENTS AND OBSTACLES TO RESOLUTION
ARTHUR M. PIPER *
I. BACKGROUND
Numerous recent articles in both the popular and technical press
constitute a fairly compelling argument that many areas of the United
States approach all too rapidly water-supply stringencies having as-
pects of dilemma.' The argument is readily conceded; the pertinent
inquiry is to examine the principal roots of the stringencies.
It can generally be stated that present practices of water-supply
management involve acquired habits some of which run counter to the
realities of hydrology. These habits all too often take the form of
policies and decisions which look towards selected effects rather than
comprehensive objectives. Specifically, a resolution of foreseeable
stringencies of supply must contend with illogical concepts for allocat-
ing available supplies among uses both present and prospective, with
circumscribed and, in many instances, inadequate institutional con-
cepts, and with inflexible water law. It can thus be said that any
success in resolving foreseeable stringencies at a still relatively early
time—and thus precluding a later generation of more complex strin-
gencies—may be measured in terms of breaks from traditional con-
cepts and procedures. Solutions both bold in scale and novel in pur-
pose are required.
A. The Problem of Quantity
Whenever in the past we have outgrown a water-supply facility,
we have usually been able to tap some new and uncommitted source
not far away. Somewhat abruptly, however, we now find the reserve
source "just over the hill" to be already in use, and we further find
ourselves racing a neighbor to a remote source not easily accessible
and perhaps literally over the horizon. In short, whereas once we
could run away from a stringency of water supply, no longer can we
presume space in which to run.
The optimal solution lies in the repeated use of the yield from
each local source.' Even so, many centers of large water demand
necessarily will reach out farther and farther to assure themselves
* B.S. (Chemical Engineering), Tufts University, 1919; M.S. (Metallurgy), Uni-
versity of Idaho, 1920; M.S. (Geology), University of Idaho, 1925; Research Geologist,
U.S. Geological Survey.
Publication authorized by the Director, U.S. Geological Survey.
1 See, e.g., A. Piper, Has the United States Enough Water? (U.S. Geol. Survey
Water-Supply Paper 1797, 1965).
2 See generally Aulenbach, Water—Our Second Most Important Natural Resource,
B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 535 (1968).
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dependable supplies. The following three examples illustrate the scope
of interregional transfers of water, and some of the problems involved.
In California, about three-fourths of the aggregate stream runoff°
originates in a part of the state having only about one-fourth of the
water demand. By transporting water from water-rich areas to water-
poor areas—that is, by a transport system having a 600-mile span—
the projected state-wide demand over the next several decades can be
met within the boundaries of the State. First stages of the system are
currently under construction.° The planning and accomplishment of
this task has been made possible only by an enlargement of the authority
and capability of state administrative institutions during a time span
of some 20 years to a scope far greater than rests in corresponding
institutions in most of the nation. Major changes have included a more-
than-tenfold increase of technical staff in the state's Department of
Water Resources, especially in skills not previously of concern; also,
authorization of a $1.75 billion issue of bonds, approved by the
electorate in 1960.
The central Arizona region has for years used virtually all the
flow of the Gila River and its tributaries, and perforce has "mined"
additional water from the ground in relatively large volume. Temporary
relief, but only temporary relief, from the region's supply stringency
is offered by a proposed import from the mainstem Colorado River
about 300 miles away. Construction of the import facility by the
federal government has been proposed but as yet has not been au-
thorized.° The alternative, a "go-it-alone" construction by the State
of Arizona, would pose overwhelming problems of institutional ade-
quacy. Financial, administrative, and technical capabilities far beyond
those that rest in existing institutions of the state would be required.
The most extreme interregional water-transport scheme thus far
proposed, the so-called NAWAPA scheme, would integrate major
water sources and water-use areas over all western North America—
in Canada, the United States, and Mexico.' Fanciful as it now may
seem, this bold suggestion may become credible within a few decades.
Implementation of this plan, however, would entail enormous difficul-
ties. International administrative institutions of unprecedented scope
would be needed even to launch investigative and design stages.
It should be evident that interregional transfers of water are no
easy matter. The very scope of any such plan calls for far-reaching
changes in present institutions and for vast construction projects.
In addition to size alone, it is important to point out two other aspects







Department of Water Resources, The California Water Plan (Bull. No.
of the Interior, Pacific Southwest Water Plan (1963).
Parsons Company, North American Water and Power Affiance: Watef
(prelim. report, April 1964).
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of interregional transfers. First, the cost per unit of deliverable
water is very much greater in the instance of an interregional
transfer than ordinarily has attached to water developed locally.
Second, the urgency for, and magnitude of, interregional trans-
fers have been projected according to present levels of effi-
ciency in the use of local supplies. The conclusion to be drawn
from this discussion is that the immediate challenge in water-supply
management is optimum reuse of local supplies. The purpose of con-
centration upon optimal reuse is, of course, to minimize water costs
over the long term and to scale down and defer interregional transfers
(inevitable though such transfers are). In meeting this challenge, a
principal objective arises, namely, water quality control.
B. The Problem of Quality
We have long pretended to the irresponsible luxury of using most
water but once in each locality, then separating gross pollutants in the
solid state by "primary treatment" and passing a still polluted effluent
downstream. This we could do with a comforting assumption that,
because the "assimilative capacity" of the receiving stream or lake
was adequate, the remaining pollutants could (and commonly did)
disintegrate by oxidation and bacterial action within a short interval of
space or time.'`
Forced to retreat from this assumption, we now undertake to
lessen the "oxygen demand" of primary effluent by "secondary treat-
ment" of wastes—that is, by starting the disintegration of the pollutants
before discharge to the receiving waters. In couple with such treatment,
it has been widely assumed that regulation of streamflow by storage
in, and release from, reservoirs could assure all the required dilution
and assimilative capacity. Even this assumption now fails in light of
the following dilemma:
(1) Present methods of water treatment are not always ef-
fective. In effluent from both metropolitan and rural areas, residues
from certain industrial chemicals and from most agricultural chemicals,
particularly herbicides and pesticides, not only are difficult to detect
but also resist disintegration by the conventional methods of waste
treatment. Currently, intensive research seeks economic and acceptable
means for "tertiary" treatment to disintegrate such intractable resi-
dues. 8
(2) Effluent from conventional treatment of domestic waste
contains nutrients—principally nitrates and phosphates—that may
7 For a comprehensive discussion of industrial water pollution control, see Hines,
Controlling Industrial Water Pollution: Color the Problem Green, 9 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L.
Rev. 553 (1968).
8 Further help may come from the chemical industry itself. For example, the deter-
gent industry, through the Soap and Detergent Association, has launched a voluntary
transition to a "soft" product that disintegrates under conventional "secondary" treatment.
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trigger a "bloom" of algae in the receiving water, and so impose still
another demand for oxygen. Such additional demand may well mean
that the stream's assimilative capacity has been exceeded. Even in so
voluminous a receiving water as Lake Erie, extensive areas are now
seriously advanced in the degenerative process of "eutrophication." 9
This excessive demand for oxygen inversely affects the degree to
which the disintegration of pollutants from an effluent may take place.
(3) Even if our sit-earns are regulated to the utmost, and dis-
regarding the constraint of cost, it is doubtful that they can deliver
fresh pure water in amounts sufficient for projected supply require-
ments.'° Paradoxically, the greater the quality control for the purposes
of maximizing supply, the greater the demand for water for purposes
of diluting and assimilating waste.
Obviously such problems of water quality must be resolved if
the problem of water quantity is to be eased through repeated reuse.
But there is no ready, single course to this end—no panacea to palliate
our traditional impatience with small measures. If we are to resolve
the problems, the break from present water management concepts and
procedures must be made. But such a break encounters a two-faced
obstacle: On the affirmative side, we rely on a principle that each in-
dividual can enjoy an absolute and timeless right to take and to use
water,' and couple that principle with administrative and legal in-
stitutions to enforce the rights between individuals.' On the negative
side, we fail in large part to foster, or even authorize, management of
a water source jointly by all its users both to achieve and to defend
optimum benefit despite natural variance in the yield of the particular
source. To a considerable extent, the principle of an absolute, timeless
right precludes easy adjustment to changes in purpose of use.
This principle is deep-rooted in the law, both in the common law
and the "riparian doctrine," which prevail in the East, and, more
significantly, in the "appropriation doctrine," which governs water
rights in the western parts of the United States. Unlike the copiously
watered East, the West has traditionally been beset with severe natural
water stringencies. It is thus more important to examine in what man-
ner the appropriation doctrine impairs resolution of the quantity and
quality problems outlined above.
II. ANTECEDENTS OF WATER-SUPPLY STRINGENCIES
Oversimplified, the appropriation doctrine breaks down into these
component principles: (1) ownership of the "corpus" of water rests in
9 A. Beeton, Indices of Great Lakes Eutrophication (Univ. of Michigan, Great
Lakes Research Div., Pub. No. 15, 1966).
19 See Aulenbach, supra note 2, at 547-48.
11 See Davis, Australian and American Water Allocation Systems Compared, 9 B.C.
Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 647, 676, 688-89, 705-09 ( 1 968).
12 See Hines, supra note 7, at 575-90; Davis, supra note 11, passim.
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the State or in the "public";" (2) an individual person, a corporate
agency, or a public agency can appropriate water for use; 14 (3) among
such appropriators, "the first in time is the first in right" and the right
to use is in the nature of a property; " and (4) the use must be "bene-
ficial" and the magnitude of the right is limited to the extent of the
benefit." Literally, each such appropriative right is virtually a guaran-
tee that the conditions of flow in the source stream, or of yield from
another kind of water source, will remain as on the priority date of the
particular appropriation. In principle, each appropriation is in an
absolute amount that, in perpetuity, is preemptive against all junior
appropriations. As applied to a stream source, the system would
theoretically meet a deficiency in flow by suspending withdrawals in
the reverse order of their priority dates, until flow was balanced by the
residual high priority demand.
The seeming definitiveness of the appropriative system is de-
ceiving. Its theoretic simplicity is complicated by numerous factors,
specifically, by the wide variability of yield from different water
sources, not only from season to season, but also from year to year;
by varying rates of withdrawal for unlike uses; by the differences in
the degree to which water is consumed by dissimilar uses; and by
changing purposes of use, especially progressive changes over a term
of years. These complications reflect to a large degree the evolutionary
development of the appropriative system.
The origins of the system rest in the practice of placer mining a
century and more ago.n In such mining the concern was with the rate
of flow, i.e., cubic feet per second, or "miner's inches," available to
operate "hydraulic giants" and sluices—the greater the flow the larger
and more numerous the giants might be, and the greater the daily
volume of placer gravel processed. As the rate of flow diminished sea-
sonally, the scope of mining was curtailed or the operation was shut
down for the duration of the low flow. Thus, volume taken per season
or per year was not a factor in determining the magnitude of an early
water right.
Similarly, early appropriations for irrigation were generally in
terms of flow only, probably in part because of the antecedent just
outlined, but probably also because they did not involve large facilities
for storing water. As security against the variable rates of flow in the
13 E.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-1-1 (1968) ("All natural waters flowing in streams and
watercourses, whether such be perennial, or torrential, within the limits of the state of
New Mexico, belong to the public. . . .").
14 E.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 61-04-02 (Supp. 1967).
15 E.g., Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 90.03.010 (1962).
16 E.g., Wyo. Stat. § 41-2 (1959) ("Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure
and limit of the right to use water at all times. . ..").
17 See 3 H. Farnham, Waters and Water Rights 2017-20 (1904).
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source stream, and in consideration of the vast acreage of land serviced
and of the rudimentary manner of cultivation, the rate claimed was al-
most inevitably the maximum at which water could be applied to the
land. Compared with present-day standards for good irrigation prac-
tice, some early rates were indeed large.
By about the end of the nineteenth century, irrigation agriculture
had occupied most of those lands in the western states which could
be served without large facilities for storing water. Orderly administra-
tion of water rights had become an obvious necessity and the several
states set about doing so.18 Agencies were created, commonly an
office of State Engineer, and all "vested" rights then existing were
recognized. An agency was to receive applications and to grant permits
for additional rights. Because action could not practicably be long de-
ferred, applications were commonly granted "subject to existing
rights.m9 Yet agency staffs were usually too small for exhaustive fact
finding and rights outstanding at any one time were often out of pro-
portion to the supply of the source stream. Thus, under the appropria-
tive system, "natural-flow" rights in numerous western basins were
perfected in an aggregate flow-rate amount exceeding actual stream-
flow throughout the driest years of record, and during considerable
parts of most other years if not all.
In effect, then, state administration of water rights was built upon
a foundation of vested natural-flow rights. In the twentieth century,
however, private and governmental agencies, both Federal and State,
constructed numerous water storage facilities whereby the flow of
many streams was, and is now, regulated to some degree.2° From such
streams, water could be delivered to users at rates greater than the
natural dry-season flow, or could even be held over from a wet year to
a dry year. A right to store water was commonly measured in terms of
a rate of flow intercepted, a rate generally as large as practicable in
relation to other commitments against the stream. The volume of water
that could be held in storage at any one time was of course limited by
reservoir dimensions, and was generally a matter of public record if
not stated in a permit to store.
Storage was undertaken for diverse purposes—in regard to irriga-
tion, not only to serve new lands, but also to assure a full supply to
antecedent natural-flow lands within the particular service area. When
storage was sufficient, water for irrigation could be delivered as
needed for an optimum rate of growth of the crop over a growth season
which continued after natural-flow rights would have been deficient.
18 The development of state administration of water rights is outlined in 1 Waters
and Water Rights §§ 20-24 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
19 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 90.03.010 (1962).
29 See R. Martin & R. Hanson, Reservoirs in the United States (U.S. Geol. Survey
Water-Supply Paper 1838, 1966).
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Under such practices, the practical basis for limiting an irrigation
water right became the gross yearly volume deliverable per acre ir-
rigated, rather than a flow rate as had been the traditional measure of a
natural-flow right. In order to assimilate storage practices into the
existing administration of water rights, it became necessary to reduce
all water rights involved to common and equitable terms.
To that end, in regard to most western streams, an adjudicatory
action redefined the several vested rights therein, as well as those sub-
sequent appropriations which may have been granted under applicable
statutory procedures. The great bulk of rights so decreed were irriga-
tion rights. Generally each such right was redefined in terms of a
yearly or seasonal volume allowance per acre, and a correlative flow
rate which commonly was less than claimed to have been vested. In
certain instances, the decreed flow rate was no more than a theoretical
average that would deliver the decreed volume within the defined
irrigation season. In truth, the seasonal volume allowance became the
practical measure of the right.
For purposes of administrative convenience, the allowed volume
per acre customarily was, and has continued to be, stated as a "not-to-
exceed" limit" that either is uniform over all of a stream's service area
or differs among a few diverse soil types or physiographic subdivisions
of the service area, but is uniform within each such type or subdivision.
An additional allowance may or may not be decreed on account of
conveyance loss in each ditch system. Obviously, the "not-to-exceed"
limit tends to be as great as has been justified by the weight of evidence
during the adjudication for serving the more permeable soils, in the
more adverse locations, under the less efficient cultivation practices.
But the "not-to-exceed" qualification is generally ineffectual and the
maximum limit becomes, in effect, an absolute and inflexible measure
of the right.
This is so since virtually no irrigator will continually apply to his
land a seasonal volume of water substantially less than the decreed
limit, unless, of course, supply is deficient. Should he do so, he would,
in theory, risk forfeiture of that part of the right not exercised during
some relevant statutory period, commonly five years or more. 22 Though
forfeiture does pose a theoretical threat, it is actually minimal; unless
evidence is compelling, the courts have been most reluctant to declare
an abandonment or a statutory forfeiture, since that remedy is in the
nature of a taking of property without compensation.' As a result,
forfeiture, whether invoked or not, provides no remedy to the in-
21 See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-17 (1968).
22 E.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 42-222 (1948) (5 years).
23 "Forfeiture or abandonment of water rights is not favored and is not to be
presumed, and all intendments are to be indulged in against a forfeiture." Hodges v.
Trail Creek Irrigation Co., 78 Idaho 10, 16, 297 P.2d 524, 527 (1956).
639
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
flexibility which decreed "not-to-exceed" limits lend to the appropria-
tive system. This inflexibility tends to foster, or prolong, inefficient
irrigation practices. Likewise, the inflexibility renders the system
incapable of adjusting to the variability of yield, of rates of with-
drawal, of consumption, and of purposes of use.
III SOME LIMITATIONS AND CONTRADICTIONS
So far discussion has been general and has outlined the anteced-
ents of the inadequacy of the appropriation doctrine as the basis for
an efficient water management system. This inadequacy can further be
illustrated by reference to several specific limitations and contradic-
tions which may presently be found in appropriative system jurisdic-
tions.
Use dissipates or destroys some water, the proportion dissipated
ranging from less than five percent of withdrawal for most industrial
uses to about a third, or locally more, of withdrawal for irrigation.
The water not dissipated ordinarily becomes a "return-flow" increment
to the original, or another, water-supply source. Time lapse between
withdrawal and return commonly is brief in the case of municipal or
industrial uses (re-cycling use excepted), but considerable in the case
of irrigation use.
Rates of consumption or of return flow may significantly affect
the appropriated rights of water users. For example, a high return rate
may well mean that junior appropriative rights have been perfected in
the return flow from senior rights upstream. In such a situation, and
in the event of short supply, literal application of the appropriative
doctrine could shut off a junior appropriator without advantage to
senior appropriators. Likewise, a nonconsuming use, whatever the
priority of its appropriation, cannot affect appropriators downstream.
Ideally, appropriative rights would reflect varying rates of consump-
tion and of return flow, but under present systems this is all too often
not the case. As a corrective measure, the priority date of appropriation
conceivably might be applied only to the part of the withdrawal that
is consumed in use, with some other schedule of precedence applying
to the return-flow component. There is, admittedly, no simple basis for
such a schedule.
In addition to consumption, virtually all use of water degrades
the return-flow component in some respect—by an increase in con-
centration of dissolved or entrained solids, or by a change in tempera-
ture, usually a rise. In general, however, responsibility for maintaining
the quality of water is ill-defined, aside from relatively strict and
common prohibitions against the discharge of certain intractable or
toxic substances into waters that are potentially usable. In fact, such
responsibility has been ignored in considerable part or tacitly ascribed
640
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to the "public." The appropriative system does not pretend to defend
water quality, as conceivably it might by a hypothetical schedule of
preferences inverse to the degree in which the return-flow component
is degraded. In similar manner, the common law and riparian doctrines
involve the unreal presumption that no user degrades the quality of
water passing to subsequent users.'
Currently the nation is designating a water quality standard for
each principal stream, whereby future degradation of quality would
be minimal and, hopefully, present serious degradation in certain
streams might be alleviated.' Certain such standards of which this
writer is informed seem more ideal than realistic. Enforcement of the
standards is by enlargement of the authority resting in an administra-
tive institution and is punitive in concept. Responsibility for achieving
the standards is, in some instances, not as yet explicit.
A different, and perhaps better, approach is taken in the Ruhr
industrial district of Europe." There a government institution publishes
water quality standards for successive reaches of the streams, operates
treatment works to achieve those standards, and assesses fees against
each industry in proportion to the load of pollutants discharged by
that industry into a stream. Each industry has the option of diminish-
ing or eliminating its fee by pre-treating its effluent partially or wholly.
This feature of options has much to commend it. No full counterpart
option appears in United States practice.
A number of the appropriative-system statutes specify the uses
considered to be "beneficial" and designate a preference among them—
generally domestic or municipal, livestock, irrigation, and industry in
that sequence." Such designation determines a preferential purpose of
use whenever the yield of a water source is insufficient for all relevant
water rights, or determines a priority sequence among unlike uses for
which applications to appropriate may pend at the same time. It does
not, however, convey to a junior applicant for a high-preference pur-
pose an unqualified privilege of condemning a right which is senior in
time but subordinate in purpose. In the opinion of the writer, principal
agencies of government should have the prerogative of condemning a
water right under the checks and balances of a procedure in eminent
domain. Further, purposes which have but recently been urged to be
in the public interest—for example, recreation based on a stream or a
lake, or preserving a stream reach in its wild state as an aesthetic re-
source—are virtually unrecognized as "beneficial."' Even though
24 Cf. W. Hutchins, Background and Modern Developments in State Water-Rights
Law § 16.2, in 1 Waters and Water Rights (R. Clarke ed. 1967).
25 Water Quality Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 903, amending 33 U.S.C. § 466 (1964).
26 H. Koenig, Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment in the Ruhr District (Int'l
Conf. on Water for Peace, paper No. 290, May 1967).
27 E.g., Ore. Rev. Stat. § 540.140 (1963).
28 But see Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 7470 (Supp. 1967) ("public parks, game pre-
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nonconsuming, such purposes may not be clearly, defendable against
potential applications that might be both junior in time and water-
consuming in type, but "beneficial" by traditional definition. Still
further, although appropriative-system statutes generally provide that
place of withdrawal or purpose of water use may be changed, such
flexibility is ascribed only to the stated "beneficial" purposes.20 Thus,
a use whose beneficialness is contestable in any degree under traditional
definitions can become wholly vulnerable should the user modify his
facilities even slightly. For the reasons here summarized, and numerous
others, the appropriative system generates little incentive toward using
water prudently. Rather, it tends to foster and perpetuate improvident
use.
Altogether, therefore, adjustment of water rights to accommodate
changing purposes of use, especially progressive change over a term
of years, faces serious obstacles. In western states, where appropriative
rights commonly equal or exceed ordinary flow of the streams and in
very large part are irrigation rights, any proposal for a substantial new
use of water would face a Hobson's choice in multiple—a difficult con-
version of a pre-existing right or rights, a new storage facility, or a
vulnerable priority.
It has been suggested repeatedly that western water rights are
subject to the "law of the market place!"2° In other words, a new
use for a superior economic return can, and appropriately should,
purchase any water rights needed. But here we face contradictions of
law, tradition and reality. Because, as a practical matter, irrigation
water rights are commonly welded to the land irrigated,' there is no
free market in the rights alone—in consequence, no widely accepted
standards of value. Economic analysis of potential agricultural return
from land with and without water, or of agricultural return in com-
parison to industrial return from the same water commonly is not
definitive becatise starting assumptions are in part intangible.
Water as a commodity is ascribed no intrinsic value, its "cost"
being little more than that of retiring debt incurred for works to inter-
cept that water and transport it to place of use. Yet water is necessary
to life, to foods that sustain life, and to fiber that provides part of the
clothing and shelter of humans. In such uses, the essentiality of water
would seem to be beyond price and above value.
serves, recreation and pleasure resorts . . ." included in the list of authorized uses); Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45-147 (Supp. 1967).
29 E.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. § 533.370 (1959).
30 See Davis, supra note 11, at 694 -95.
at E.g., Wyo. Stat. § 41-2 (1959) ("Water being always the property of the state,
rights to its use shall attach to the land for irrigation. . . ."). Statutes often provide
that appropriated rights may be transferred to others for use on other lands if the




But for so long each year as it is available, water customarily is
applied generously, even wastefully, in irrigation agriculture; such
usage may well be inherent in the decreed water right. The inescap-
able alternative to such usage is a greater cost for labor to apply the
water meticulously. There is, however, no incentive to adopt the
alternative. Indeed, as the general costs of farm labor mount, efficiency
in the use of irrigation water tends to be driven downward; concur-
rently, any overly generous basis for a decreed right tends to become
entrenched more firmly. Moreover, the competitive position of agricul-
tural products has been so weak that an acceptable cost of labor for
using water efficiently is severely constrained, commonly to the barest
minimum. In contrast, the competitive position of manufactured goods
is sufficiently strong that cost of labor has been under relatively little
constraint and has been virtually synonymous with "value added."
In this maze of contradictions, what would be a free-market
"value" of water used to grow lettuce and out-of-season melons in the
Pacific Southwest versus that used in connection with manufacture of
a consumer product whose essentiality is questionable? Are such values
chargeable against the total volume of water taken from the source or
against the component consumed in use or incorporated into the prod-
uct? Should a negative value—that is, a fee—be assessed against pol-
luted effluent? We sorely need fresh, sound concepts and a scope of
administration that can interject order into this confused field. Again,
the indicated direction lies toward optimum efficiency in the use of
water, a goal that is becoming inevitable even though its attainment
will weaken the basis of many decreed water rights.
Traditionally, municipal supply systems in the United States
sterilize all the water they deliver, even though no more than a small
percentage of the total delivery requires such sterilization. This prac-
tice is often coupled with a prohibition against dual distribution sys-
tems in accord with public health standards. Also traditionally, waters
containing municipal wastes that have been treated—in some instances
treated only minimally—become a component of the supply to a suc-
ceeding system down-basin, and there are resterilized for redistribu-
tion. Many nondomestic purposes, in the aggregate the major part of
all, could, however, be served with nonsterile water or even with mini-
mally treated sewage. A pioneer example of such service is Bethlehem
Steel Company's Sparrow Point steel plant near Baltimore, Maryland,
whose process water is reclaimed from sewage.
Certain local stringencies on sources of pure fresh water—strin-
gencies such as can only become more numerous and more severe with
time—could be eased substantially by judicious separate delivery of
nonsterile or reclaimed water for appropriate classes of nondomestic
use. To be practical, such separate delivery would be to some limited
643
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
part of each water service area, as established by appropriate and
discriminate zoning. In addition, zoning becomes a credible means
toward segregating intractable wastes, and treating or disposing of
those wastes separately, as would be most feasible. Separate disposal
of intractable wastes is not new but commonly has been of local extent
only. A pioneer example of a subregional system (not based on zoning,
however) is the current proposal by the United States Bureau of Rec-
lamation of a master drain to collect agricultural wastes from all the
San Joaquin Valley, California.
In general, zoning may be considered distasteful, but its capabili-
ties might outweigh disadvantages if applied as a local means of easing
prospective water-supply stringencies. Commensurate authorization by
legislation or regulation would be necessary in many areas, as would
an appropriate administrative institution.
Finally, reference has been made to existing region-wide and in-
terregional systems for conveyance from water-rich to water-poor
areas. The inevitable trend will be toward ever greater quantities of
water conveyed ever greater distances to localities of principal water
use. Countering this are reservations, by statute in several states, 32
whereby the so-called areas of origin are guaranteed sufficient water
for ultimately realizing their full economic and social potentials. The
intent of such reservation is obvious. Unfortunately some have been
expressed in terms so general that, in effect, the area of origin holds
a power of veto over projects to develop water that is currently surplus.
IV. BASES FOR RESOLVING OBSTACLES
We must devise more comprehensive policies and institutions for
managing water supplies. Essential to the attainment of such a goal is
the creation of a reasonable limitation upon the timeless run of water
rights as they are now recognized—of the virtually dimensionless
right that in theory issues from the riparian and common law doctrines,
and of the absolute and commonly over-generous right under the
doctrine of prior appropriation. Periodic reappraisal of individual
rights against total water-supply commitment and requirement should
be the controlling general policy.
In the more copiously watered East, generally the province of
the common law and riparian doctrines, provided first that the aggre-
gate potential water yield usually is greater than the aggregate of
existing uses, and provided further that relatively little water is con-
sumed, a system of term licenses, issued under the police power, is
suggested to cover the withdrawals of substantial size. Renewal of a
license from term to term should be assured to the licensee, to the
32 E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45-153 (1956). For a reciprocal provision, see Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 533.515 (1957).
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extent a valid use continues. However, each renewal would involve
review and adjustment of provisional terms that might be advisable
to restrain overdrafts or excessive interference between withdrawals.
In regard to treatment and disposal of wastes incidental to the use of
water, responsibility would be stated explicitly. Several eastern states
now follow variants of such a procedure."
In the poorly watered West, generally the province of the prior-
appropriation doctrine, where commonly the aggregate of existing uses
is at least intermittently greater than the natural yield of the water
sources, and where a substantial part of withdrawn water is consumed
in use, another procedure seems more feasible. Specifically, the police
power might be invoked for periodically verifying, and as necessary
adjusting, the magnitude of each withdrawal in relation to the con-
tinuing use, to interim changes in the capability of flow-regulating
works, and to local overdraft or interference among withdrawals.
Again, the review would define or redefine responsibility in regard to
management of "return flow" and of waste load.
Alternatively to such procedures under the police power, and to
the writer preferably, there might be created at the initiative of a
competent administrative institution, or of water users acting collec-
tively and voluntarily, a system of water-supply authorities or con-
servancy districts. Each such authority or district would have jurisdic-
tion over a whole stream basin or other natural water-supply unit and
would exercise all participating water rights jointly, for optimum
basin-wide advantage. A precedent for this sort of water management
institution was set by the State of Oregon in its ground water code
adopted in 1955."
Assuming imaginative executive leadership, the authority or dis-
trict just outlined might resolve the preceding contradictions and relax
the limitations. Specifically, in taking steps to relieve a water-supply
stringency, it might disregard priorities that were not relevant hydro-
logically, even though those priorities were junior. It might adapt water
rights to changing, purposes of use, especially progressive change
which, over a term of years, overreached the literal terms of early
water rights. It might educate water right holders to the need, and
so establish incentive, for more efficient use of water. To the end of
minimizing the quality degradation of return flows, the authority or
district could launch a concerted attack of a scope beyond the capa-
bility of any individual user of water. Enlarging this potential, it
might take the initiative toward comprehensive management of water
quality, provided it had authority for levying fees to finance necessary
works. In similar vein, it could establish novel practices such as the
33 E.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 455A (Stipp. 1966).
34 Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 537.505-.795 (1963).
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separate delivery of sterile and nonsterile water when and where ap-
propriate, or establish use zones according to multiple standards of
water quality.
Ideally, the water-supply authority or conservancy district would
be permitted wide discretion, constrained only by general statute. At
the initiative of, or by the consent of, participating water users, it
would manage the common water source as a consolidated facility, to
suit conditions peculiar to the locality. In such a manner it could in
large part escape the rigidity of conventional water law.
Procedures such as those just outlined would advisedly risk the
disadvantages of a considerable new bureaucracy in behalf of the
potential advantage of better long-term management of the nation's
water destiny. Effectiveness would depend on the wisdom in which the
administrative institutions were designed, and in which the enabling
statutes were framed. But, as has been stated, we must ultimately have
more comprehensive and knowledgeable water management.
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